This book is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a "Pound-Defense" deal with the US. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labor Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.
About the Author
SAKI DOCKRILL is a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at King's College London. Dr Dockrill has written extensively on Anglo-US relations in Europe and Asia since 1945 and her recent publications include Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, and she is co-editor of Cold War Respite: the Geneva Summit of July 1955. She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, General Editor of Palgrave's Cold War History series and a co-editor of the Journal of Cold War History.